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Oliver J. Kim* 
 
“You know, when people think about drugs, they’re just disgusted by it. They 
just want to lock them up, and throw away the key. But it’s more complex than that.” 
—U.S. President Richard Nixon1 
 
Fifty years ago, a Democratic Congress and a Republican White House—led 
by a President who would face the threat of impeachment—produced notable laws 
addressing public health, worker safety, and environmental protections. One of the 
laws produced in that era, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),2 has shaped drug 
policy and criminal justice over the last fifty years. Since its passage, Congress has 
moved the CSA away from its roots in public health and more toward punitive 
measures.3 
Today, because of our federalist system, the CSA poses a challenge to a policy 
decision that an increasing number of states have adopted but our federal 
government has not: the legalization of marijuana. In fact, the majority of states have 
legalized marijuana for medical purposes while a smaller number have done so for 
non-clinical purposes.4 But despite its apparent popularity with voters,5 Congress 
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1    Interview with Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr., Frontline, PBS SOCAL (2000), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/krogh.html [http://perma.cc/D4HH-
XVCM] (interviewing Krogh, the White House Deputy for Domestic Affairs under President Nixon, 
and his account of Nixon’s view on addiction). 
2    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
3    David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: how a “big tent” reform became a 
punitive drug law, 76 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 10–11 (2004) (“Nixon declared the 1970s 
to be ‘a great age of reform of the institutions of American government’ and pressed for changes in any 
number of federal laws, those governing the draft, welfare system, tax code, revenue sharing, and 
economic opportunity programs being among the best-known examples.”) (citation omitted). 
4    Id. at 10. This paper will use the terms adult or recreation to refer to legal marijuana use 
without a health professional’s prescription. 
5    Andrew Daniller, Two thirds of Americans support marijuana legalization, PEW RES. CTR. 
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has not made a similar effort to amend the CSA to legalize marijuana. As states 
continue to move to adopt legalization , the conflict with federal law creates 
confusion in many important policy areas, including banking, taxation, and the 
practice of medicine.6 While states cannot nullify federal law to quell this confusion, 
their movement toward a specific policy goal can serve as a nudge for the federal 
government to adopt a similar objective.7 
The acrimony of our current political moment makes it hard to imagine that our 
divided government could provide much needed legal clarity by amending the CSA.8 
But that conventional wisdom would be wrong. Congress has passed major 
legislation— not just once but several times in recent years under two very different 
presidential administrations— to substantively address civil and criminal drug 
policy. Perhaps such legislation signals a shift in political thinking on drug policy 
and criminalization that we have not seen in decades, harkening back to how the 
CSA initially balanced competing priorities in its approach to drug policy. At a 
minimum, these laws provide advocates with some guidance as well as 
recommendations for where there are policy gaps. 
This Article will examine the political and process barriers that may stymie 
efforts to provide clarity and relief to the states that have taken steps to legalize the 
use of marijuana. First, the Article will provide a short historical overview of the 
CSA’s passage and the conflicting visions for its original purpose. Second, the 
Article will discuss states’ approaches to regulating marijuana and the conflicts with 
federal law due to the CSA. Third, the Article will highlight several recent federal 
laws that may bode well for amending the CSA and then finally make additional 




(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-
legalization/ [https://perma.cc/F8N4-FAHD]. 
6    Natalie Fertig, Cannabis: The Essential Guide, POLITICO PRO 10–11, 15, 17–20 
https://www.politicopro.com/Cannabis/Cannabis-Essential-Guide-FULL-REPORT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WLJ8-8YYV].; Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 617, 619–20 (2016) 
7    Patricia Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 850–51 (2017) (noting that 
“states may, nevertheless, find value in [state-based] drug regulation is because it may be a useful 
strategy for driving federal policy”); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Nonjudicial 
Actors, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1147, 1157–60 (discussing how states have attempted to register 
disapproval of a federal court decision that limited states’ authority). 
8    See Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 3 (2019), 
http://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6XTZ-MSMJ 
] (“Majorities believe the public’s confidence in the U.S. government and in each other is shrinking, 
and most believe a shortage of trust in government and in other citizens makes it harder to solve some 
of the nation’s key problems.”). 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA 
 
American drug policy includes both the approval of drugs by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for patient use in the commercial marketplace and the use of 
the criminal code to restrict or even prohibit substances. The CSA initially contained 
both public health and interdiction approaches to drug control: when Congress 
debated it five decades ago, it intended the CSA to harmonize a hodgepodge of 
existing federal criminal laws on drug policy and to authorize public health 
approaches to drug control as a means of limiting demand.9 But in the intervening 
years, the CSA moved toward a harsher approach as political winds changed.10 
 
A. The Foundation of the Controlled Substances Act 
 
At the start of the twentieth century, the federal government started exercising 
increasing control over drug policy: either by allowing for the commercialization of 
substances that met a complex approval process or by criminalizing other substances 
as illegal for use or even possession.11 Under the commercial stream of federal drug 
policy, Congress passed a series of laws starting with the 1906 Pure Food and Drug 
Act12 to create a formal regulatory process to demonstrate whether a drug was safe 
and effective for human consumption.13 This line of statutes resulted in the creation 
of the FDA, which became seen as “a ‘gatekeeper’ to protect public health by using 
its regulatory authority over the drug approval process.”14 For instance, the FDA 
began regulating the use of addictive non-narcotic drugs after the medical 
community recognized that drugs such as “barbiturates were not addicting in the 
narcotic sense, but that they were habit forming and subject to improper use.”15 
In a contemporaneous parallel stream of federalization, Congress used a 
different set of legal authorities to address the growing concern about the addictive 
nature of narcotics, ultimately leading to interdiction and criminalization.16 In its 
initial foray, Congress passed the Harrison Act17 under its tax authority in order to 
 
9    Courtwright, supra note 3, at 10. 
10   Id. 
11   Id.; see also infra note 19. 
12   Food and Drug Act, P.L. 59-384 (1906). 
13   Oliver J. Kim, Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of Life Better Than Others?, 
41 DALHOUSIE L.J. 94, 97 (Spring 2018). 
14   Id.; see also Joseph F. Spillane, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 DRUG AND 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 17, 19 (2004) (discussing how federal law “created a class of drugs available 
only on a physician’s prescription, and gave the FDA authority to designate which drugs would be 
placed in that category”) (citation omitted). 
15   Spillane, supra note 14. 
16   Id. at 18. 
17   Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). 
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regulate narcotics (defined as opioids and cocaine) and thus established the Treasury 
Department as an early regulator of these substances.18 This statute marked a 
substantial shift in regulatory policy, as the states had principally been the primary 
regulators of narcotics although without any uniformity.19 
The Treasury Department largely resisted adding additional non-narcotics to its 
responsibilities under its Federal Bureau of Narcotics.20 But the bureau’s influential 
director Harry Anslinger supported criminalizing marijuana, urging action at both 
the state and federal level.21 Consequently, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act 
in 1937, adding the only non-narcotic drug under the jurisdiction of the Treasury 
Department.22 The Boggs Act23 subsequently added criminal penalties, including 
mandatory minimum sentences, for possession and trafficking of marijuana and 
narcotics, and the federal government encouraged states to pass similar “mini-
Boggs” legislation to standardize drug laws.24 
During the 1960s, “Congress’s habit of ad hoc legislation, sometimes based on 
the constitution’s taxing power and sometimes on its commerce power . . . produced 
a patchwork of enforcement agencies with different priorities and resources” instead 
of establishing a unified response to replace the parallel and confusing patchwork of 
state policies.25 Moreover, this ad hoc process failed to respond to community needs 
or changes in science, medicine, and public health: “[n]ew substances were being 
introduced into widespread use faster than research could develop and the traditional 
addiction model, which had been based on physical dependence, was not 
adequate.”26 
The CSA might have looked completely different if the Johnson administration 
formulated legislation in time for congressional consideration before the 1968 
election.27 Instead, the incoming Nixon administration—with a decidedly harsher 
 
18   Spillane, supra note 14, at 18. 
19   See Kathleen Ferraiolo, From Killer Weed to Popular Medicine: The Evolution of American 
Drug Control Policy, 1937–2000, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 147, 150 (2007); see also Courtwright, supra note 
3, at 10. 
20   Spillane, supra note 14, at 19. 
21   Joseph F. Spillane & David B. Wolcott, A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
233 (2013) (noting that Anslinger “presented marijuana as addictive, a gateway to more serious drugs 
like heroin, and a source of crime”); Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 153–54. 
22   Id. Although the Marijuana Tax Act was framed as a tax law to quell Anslinger’s concerns 
about the constitutionality of regulating marijuana, it effectively banned the use of marijuana because 
the tax was prohibitively high. Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 153–154; David Katner, Up in Smoke: 
Removing Marijuana from Schedule I, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 173 (2018). 
23   P.L. 82-255 (1951). 
24   SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 21, at 234. 
25   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 10. 
26   Spillane, supra note 14, at 21. 
27   JOHN HUDAK, Marijuana: A Short History, 45–48., (The Brookings Institution, 1st ed. 2016). 
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view on drug policy28 developed the initial proposals that ultimately became the 
CSA.29 The Nixon administration believed drug abuse to be a priority issue because 
“the problem was getting out of hand.”30 Nixon himself believed that drug misuse 
and addiction was a cause of crime, and he had campaigned on reducing the supply 
side of this equation.31 Thus, the administration had determined that the existing 
legal authorities were inadequate and needed to be replaced with a single modern 
law that would give the government the appropriate tools and flexibility in order to 
combat this problem.32 
Congress, however, viewed the country as facing “three very visible drug 
problems”: an increase in heroin use among those living in urban areas as well as 
among service members stationed in Vietnam, and with young people using 
marijuana and psychedelics.33 In general, Congress was wary of the federal approach 
to drug control: “the conventional liberal wisdom [was] that federal officials had 
botched the psychotropic drug problem while demonizing narcotic offenders and 
stonewalling maintenance experiments . . . . Above all, the reformers thought that 
the old sanctions, especially those involving marijuana, were unfair and inflexible, 
and brought disrepute upon the control system.”34 
Recognizing the need to compromise with the more liberal “establishment”35 
in Congress, President Nixon proposed a compromise between interdiction and 
public health approaches to drug control.36 Notably, key officials in the 
administration agreed with some of Congress’s assessment and believed “that the 
new guidelines [under the CSA] would make the system fairer and more workable, 
while preserving moral distinctions among casual users, addicts, and organized 
criminal traffickers, with the heaviest sentences reserved for the latter.”37 Ultimately, 
Nixon’s proposal became the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
 
28   Id. at 49. 
29   Spillane, supra note 14, at 21. 
30   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 11. 
31   Id. 
32   Id. at 10. 
33   Jerome H. Jaffe, One Bite of the Apple: Establishing the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse 
Prevention, 43, 45 in One Hundred Years of Heroin (David Musto, eds. 2002). 
34   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 12. 
35   Id. at 11. 
36   Id. President Nixon’s proposal in July 1969 was a “10-point action plan”: “points 1–5 dealt 
with supply control. Points 6–10 emphasized education, research, rehabilitation, training, and 
communication.” 
37   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 12. 
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Control Act,38 which included the CSA as part of the effort to unify federal 
approaches to drug control.39 
Although the CSA had initially been passed with “something in it for 
everybody,”40 it increasingly became pulled toward criminalization and away from 
public health.41 In the 1970s, middle-class parents became increasingly fearful of the 
seemingly growing acceptance of marijuana use among young people.42 These fears, 
however, accompanied prejudices as illicit drug use was associated with “minority 
subcultures—musicians, artists, urban African Americans, Hispanic laborers.”43 
Thus, the public feared not just that “white middle-class youth” were using illicit 
drugs44 but that they were associating with “deviant” elements of society.45 
Concerned about the harms of marijuana—in terms of both physical harm and social 
harms— and its possible gateway effect to harsher drugs, organized groups of 
parents successfully lobbied for tougher criminal sanctions and “zero tolerance” 
laws, rather than pushing for harm-reduction approaches.46 Subsequently, as certain 
controlled substances became cheaper and easier to produce, the government 




38   Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
39   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 11. “The legislation itself reflected this multi-front approach. 
The CSA was part (Titles II and III) of . . . the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970. Title I provided authority and money for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) to mount additional prevention and treatment efforts through community mental health centers 
and public health service hospitals. It authorized the National Institute of Mental Health to increase 
research and training. It protected the privacy rights of subjects under the care of approved researchers. 
All of these were unmistakably public-health initiatives, part of the same legislation as the CSA.”  
40   Id. at 13. 
41   Hudak, supra note 27, at 75–77, 81–83. While there were some efforts at public health, id. 
at 73, its educational efforts have been criticized as failures, id. at 80–81. 
42   Courtwright, supa note 3 at 11. While seemingly concerned about the societal costs of 
potentially losing a generation to drug abuse, Nixon also stoked parents’ fears as a political device by 
arguing, “It is doubtful that an American parent can send a son or daughter to college today without 
exposing the young man or woman to drug abuse.”  
43   SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 21, at 260. 
44   Id. 
45   Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 156 and 161; see also Spillane & Wolcott, supra note 21, at 260. 
46   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 13. 
47   Id.; Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect of 
Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 382–83 (2014); see also 
Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 791, 
797 (Feb. 25, 2019) (noting that “[f]or the past three decades, federal criminal justice legislation has 
mostly been a one-way ratchet towards overcriminalization, longer sentences, and mostly expanding 
federal prison populations.”) 
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B. The CSA’s treatment of drugs: Scheduling 
 
The heart of the CSA is its scheduling of controlled substances, which 
determines how criminal penalties are assessed. The CSA establishes a regulatory 
scheme for classifying drugs under a five-tiered schedule: drugs under Schedule I 
have the most restrictions and are considered to have no medical value, while drugs 
under Schedule V have the least restrictions.48 When it passed the CSA, Congress 
expressly included certain substances within each schedule,49 and it also empowered 
the Attorney General to reclassify a controlled substance to a lower schedule or 
completely remove the substance in question.50 To be classified under Schedule I, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) must find that the drug has a high 
potential for abuse, 51 has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States, 52 and lacks “an accepted safety for use” under medical supervision.53 
Conversely, drugs under Schedules II through V have a “currently accepted medical 
use in treatment in the United States.”54 As a political compromise,55 the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) or “any interested party” can also petition the 
Justice Department to add, reclassify, or remove a drug from the schedule, just as 
the Attorney General could on “his own motion.”56 
When Congress passed the CSA, it placed marijuana under Schedule I.57 Since 
then, advocates have filed five petitions to call for it to be rescheduled—all 
 
48   For a useful summary with examples of drugs falling under each of the five Schedules, see 
Elizabeth Hartney, Controlled Drugs in the Controlled Substance Act, VERYWELLMIND (Sept. 29, 
2019), http://www.verywellmind.com/what-are-controlled-drugs-22310 [http://perma.cc/HC5N-
MCX6]. Drug schedules are different from the five classes of drugs—narcotics, depressants, 
stimulants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids—that fall under the CSA. Id. 
49   21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
50   21 U.S.C.A. § 811(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
51   21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A) (2018); see also MARGARET BATTIN ET AL., DRUGS AND JUSTICE 
56–59 (2008) (discussing the DEA’s authority if a new drug has “abuse potential”). 
52   21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2018). 
53   21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C) (2018). 
54   21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2)(B) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)(B) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(4)(B) 
(2018); 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5)(B) (2018). 
55   Spillane, supra note 14, at 22. 
56   21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2015). See also 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2015) (explaining that when making 
this determination, the DEA must consider eight factors laid out in the CSA: “(1) Its actual or relative 
potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. (3) The state of 
current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its history and current pattern 
of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. (6) What, if any, risk there is to the public 
health. (7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate 
precursor of a substance already controlled under this subchapter.”). 
57   21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018) (listing marijuana (under its prior spelling of “marihuana”) under 
Schedule I at (c)(10)). As another participant in the symposium has noted, it is not clear why Congress 
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unsuccessful—and often the DEA took a lengthy amount of time to issue a 
decision.58 The DEA has laid out a five-part test to determine whether a substance, 
such as marijuana, has an accepted medical use: “the drug’s chemistry is not known 
and reproducible; there are no adequate safety studies; there are no adequate and 
well-controlled studies proving efficacy; the drug is not accepted by qualified 
experts; and the scientific evidence is not widely available.”59 Several petitioners 
have attempted to sue the DEA, but the courts have upheld the DEA’s denials.60 
Many of these challenges have rested on whether the DEA can appropriately 
claim that marijuana has no medical value.61 Some commentators have noted that 
the FDA has approved new drug applications for purified and synthetic versions of 
products that are present in marijuana for particular medical indications.62 These 
approvals would suggest that there is a medical use for marijuana, thus contradicting 
 
initially included marijuana on Schedule I. Melanie Reid, Goodbye Marijuana Schedule I—Welcome 
to a Post-Legalization World, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 175) (noting that the scant legislative history 
suggests the placement was temporary until additional recommendations could be made); see also 
BATTIN, supra note 51, at 157–58 (questioning why “marijuana, to which no fatalities have been 
directly attributed, a Schedule I drug, while tobacco and alcohol are not scheduled at all.”). But see 
JONATHAN CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 91–93 (2d ed. 2016) (arguing that the 
Schedules should be read as “two big bins, one for those with no currently accepted medical use 
(Schedule I) and another for those that are currently used as medicine (Schedules II–V)” and noting 
there is no other place to put substances with “medium or medium-high” risk of abuse other than 
Schedule I). 
58   Diane Hoffmann et al., Will The FDA’s Approval Of Epidiolex Lead to Rescheduling 
Marijuana?, HEALTH AFFAIRS: HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, July 12, 2018, http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/ 
10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/ [http://perma.cc/94UU-ZWF6] (“The first petition (1972) took 
22 years before a decision was issued; the second (1995) took six years; and a 2002 petition was not 
decided until 2011. The most recent petitions (2009 and 2011) were decided in 2016.”). For more on 
the failed petitions, see Rebecca Eisenberg & Deborah Leiderman, Cannabis for Medical Use: FDA 
and DEA Regulation in the Hall of Mirrors, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 246, 256–61 (2019). In 2015, 
Congress set a deadline for DEA to act on scheduling recommendations for new drugs amendments to 
the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 823(i)(2) (2018). 
59   Denial of Petition To Initiate Proceedings To Reschedule Marijuana, 81 FED. REG. 53688 
(proposed Aug. 12, 2016). 
60   Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 439–41 (D.C. Cir. 2013); All. for 
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1131–33 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
61   DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, REMOVING MARIJUANA FROM THE SCHEDULE OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES 2 (2019), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/marijuana-scheduling_january_ 
2019_0.pdf; Eisenberg & Leiderman, supra note xxx at 261 n.100–01.  
62   Eisenberg & Leiderman, supra note 61, at 255 (discussing FDA approval of drug products 
with synthetic THC and an approved cannabidiol, all of which have been removed from Schedule I). 
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its placement on Schedule I.63 But the FDA has not approved marijuana itself “in 
plant form,” which the DEA relied upon in one of its denials.64 
Classifying a drug under Schedule I greatly restricts potential research that 
could demonstrate whether a controlled substance actually has medical use.65 
Although the CSA expanded medical research and addiction treatment at HHS,66 
Congress also gave greater control to the Justice Department—not to HHS—to 
approve research using Schedule I controlled substances under the rationale of 
preventing the inappropriate diversion of such drugs during clinical trials.67 
 
II. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON 
MARIJUANA POLICY 
 
In our federalist system, the federal government cannot dictate states’ criminal 
laws, but it often plays a leadership role in influencing and standardizing them.68 For 
example, when the CSA became law, the Nixon administration urged the states to 
adopt a Uniform Controlled Substances Act.69 This section will explore how at the 
midpoint of the CSA’s fifty-year history, states began to deviate from the CSA’s 
treatment of marijuana and the consequences of that policy divide. 
 
A. State Efforts to Legalize Marijuana 
 
As other options for changes proved unsuccessful, advocates for marijuana 
reform turned to popular referendums as a way to bypass resistant legislatures.70 The 
first success was in California: after several legislative failures, advocates petitioned 
 
63   Hoffmann notes that at the time of its 2016 decisions, the FDA had approved three 
cannabinoid-containing drug products. Hoffman, supra note 58 (referring to Press Release, DEA 
Announces Actions Related To Marijuana And Industrial Hemp, Drug Enforcement Administration 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2016/08/11/dea-announces-actions-related-
marijuana-and-industrial-hemp). 
64   Id. (arguing that in its 2016 decision, the DEA’s assertion that “there were no marijuana 
products approved by the FDA nor under review at the FDA for any indication . . . suggests the DEA 
is referring to marijuana in plant form”); see also Eisenberg & Leiderman, supra note 61, at 261 
(pointing out that the FDA “noted the absence of an approved NDA for cannabis (broadly defined) in 
recommending to DEA that it maintain cannabis in Schedule I”). 
65   Grace Wallack & John Hudak, Marijuana Rescheduling: A Partial Prescription for Policy 
Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 208–12 (2016). 
66   Courtwright, supra note 3, at 11. 
67   See Spillane, supra note 14, at 22–23. 
68   SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 21, at 234–35. 
69   See id. (“Today, every U.S. state has passed this legislation [the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act], ensuring that the federal government sets the terms of drug control.”). 
70   Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 163. 
70   OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  Vol: 18.1:61 
for a popular referendum to legalize marijuana for medical purposes.71 Advocates 
focused on the widespread belief that marijuana could provide relief for those with 
illnesses such as AIDS and cancer.72 The passage—by a 55% to 44% margin—of 
Proposition 215 in 1996 marked the first time  that a state legalized medical 
marijuana.73 Subsequently, a majority of the states and the District of Columbia have 
legalized medical marijuana.74 
Building on these successes, advocates have turned toward legalizing 
marijuana for recreational, or “adult,” use, and time will tell if this movement is as 
successful as efforts to allow for medical marijuana. In 2012, voters in Colorado75 
and Washington76 passed ballot initiatives, making the two states the first to legalize 
marijuana for adult-use purposes. Subsequently, Alaska,77 California,78 Illinois,79 
 
71   Id. at 163–65. 
72   Id. at 167–68. 
73   Proposition 215, printed in Cal. Sec’y State, California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election 
November 5, 1996, at 58 (1996). 
74   State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Sept. 27, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/ 
state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/9CBM-CEPH]. By the time this article sees print, 
the number of states will likely grow. Mona Zhang, Marijuana legalization may hit 40 states. Now 
what?, POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/20/marijuana-legalization-
federal-laws-100688. 
75   COLO. CONST. amend. 64. A prior amendment, that would have decriminalized marijuana in 
2006, had failed. Colorado Votes In Favor Of Pot Legalization, CBS DENVER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:56 
PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/11/06/no-on-64-concedes-colorado-votes-in-favor-of-pot-legal 
ization/ [http://perma.cc/C3LH-FWN3]. 
76   Initiative Measure 502 (Wash. 2012). 
77   A Summary of Measure 2, An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and Use of 
Marijuana, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/alaska/a-summary-of-measure-2-
an-act-to-tax-and-regulate-the-production-sale-and-use-of-marijuana/ [http://perma.cc/RJ7W-RDUP] 
(discussing successful 2014 ballot measure). 
78   CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550.5(a)(3) (West 2019) (explaining that AUMA, under the initiative 
Prop. 64, was enacted into the state legislature). 
79   410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019). Illinois is the first state to approve legal sales 
through the state legislature rather than a ballot measure. 
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Maine,80 Massachusetts,81 Michigan,82 Nevada,83 Oregon,84 and Vermont85 adopted 
adult-use policies, often with the expectation of raising state revenues while hoping 
to reduce enforcement efforts.86 
In addition to the divergence between medical and recreational use of 
marijuana, the approach used in each state toward legalization—particularly for 
recreational use—has varied as well.87 Although the issue seems popular with 
voters,88 legalization for recreational use occurred in most states through ballot 
initiatives, not through the legislative process.89 This difference is even starker in 
 
80   Adult-use marijuana rules, finalized; sales on the horizon, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 
27, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/maine/ [http://perma.cc/3W5U-S7HE] (discussing successful 
2016 ballot measure and the delays in implementation). 
81   As retail stores open across the state, regulators consider delivery, social consumption rules, 
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/massachusetts/ 
[http://perma.cc/69SH-HNA6] (discussing successful 2012 ballot measure). 
82   Adult-use stores continue to open; expungement bill awaits Senate action, MARIJUANA POL’Y 
PROJECT (July 22, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/michigan/ [http://perma.cc/NFE-QCBF] 
(discussing successful 2018 ballot measure). 
83   States increasingly looking to Nevada as a model, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Nov. 5, 
2018), http://www.mpp.org/states/nevada/ [http://perma.cc/VY55-38YQ] (discussing successful 2016 
ballot measure). 
84   The Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act: A Summary 
of Measure 91, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (last visited Oct. 9, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/ 
oregon/summary-of-oregons-measure-91/ [http://perma.cc/R9FH-2AMD] (discussing successful 2014 
ballot measure). 
85   Vermont became the first state to decriminalize, by legislation, the adult-use of marijuana by 
decriminalizing possession and limited cultivation of cannabis by adults twenty-one and older. 
Vermonters enjoy legal home-grown cannabis; bill to regulate retail sales passes Senate—House to 
take up bill in early 2020, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (May 28, 2019), 
http://www.mpp.org/states/vermont/ [http://perma.cc/4MUY-9YSW]. However, this state law did not 
set up a regulatory system for sales or production. Wilson Ring, Vermont, New Hampshire Both Could 
Delay Marijuana Proposals, CBS BOSTON (May 18, 2019, 2:35 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2 
019/05/18/vermont-new-hampshire-could-delay-recreational-marijuana-proposals/ 
[http://perma/cc/9J78-GSB2]. 
86   Patrick O’Brien, Medical Marijuana and Social Control: Escaping Criminalization and 
Embracing Medicalization, 34 DEVIANT BEHAV. 423, 425 (“Policymakers have anticipated that a shift 
away from the criminalization of marijuana . . . would reduce the costs and problems caused by drug 
prohibition[.]”); see also Fertig, supra note 6, at 6 (displaying states marijuana sales in 2017); Kamin, 
supra note 6, at 654–55 (noting that the marijuana market—"estimated to be worth $40 billion 
annually”–is largely untaxed and operated illegally). 
87   Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 149 (“The growing willingness of policy entrepreneurs to invoke 
the initiative process may heighten political conflict between federal and state institutions and actors 
with divergent policy priorities.”). 
88   Hartig & Geiger, supra note 5. 
89   A referendum, however, failed in North Dakota that would have legalized marijuana for adult 
use and expunged prior offenses automatically. North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and 
Automatic Expungement Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, 
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efforts around recreational marijuana. Of the states that have legalized recreational 
use, only Illinois90 and Vermont91 have done so via the legislative process, with high-
profile legislative failures in the politically liberal states of Connecticut,92 New 
Jersey,93 New Mexico,94 and New York.95 While some opposition focused on oft-
cited concerns about criminal activity, other political concerns included the impact 
on low-income communities and whether these communities would see the 
economic benefits of legalization.96 
 
B. Policy Conflicts in a Federalist System 
 





90   410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019). 
91   Ring, supra note 85 (discussing how Vermont had decriminalized recreational use of 
marijuana but had not yet passed a scheme for regulating such use). 
92   Ryan Holz, Connecticut Joins Other Northeast States in Failing to Pass Recreational 
Marijuana Legislation in 2019, JD SUPRA (June 14, 2019), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
connecticut-joins-other-northeast-97789/ [http://perma.cc/QDY8-PTMD]. 
93   Ryan Hutchins et al., Legal pot bill dead: New Jersey lawmakers to move ahead with 2020 
referendum, POLITICO (May 15, 2019, 11:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
jersey/story/2019/05/15/marijuana-bill-dead-new-jersey-lawmakers-to-move-forward-with-
referendum-1017330 [http://perma.cc/5FCC-CLZ4]. 
94   N.M. Mut., Recreational marijuana use in New Mexico could pass in 2020. Will your 
business be ready?, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (June 1, 2019), http://www.bizjournals.com 
/albuquerque /news/2019/06/01/recreational-marijuana-use-in-new-mexico-could.html [http://perma. 
cc/Z675-NSWT]. 
95   Joseph Spector & Jon Campbell, Why legalizing marijuana in New York failed, but 
decriminalizing it passed, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (June 21, 2019, 8:20 AM), http://www. 
democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/06/21/why-legalizing-pot-new-york-
failed-but-decriminalizing-passed/1521505001/ [http://perma.cc/5Z6T-TUGE]. 
96   Vivian Wang, Final Push to Legalize Pot Fails in New York, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/nyregion/marijuana-legalization-ny.html?module=inline 
[http://perma.cc/6GWS-L8QK] (finding that suburban state senators might not have voted for the bill); 
Nick Corasaniti, Effort to Legalize Marijuana in New Jersey Collapses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/nyregion/new-jersey-marijuana.html [http://perma.cc/Z2TL-
K38D] (noting that lawmakers were concerned about the public health impact on minority communities 
and “challenges faced by other states that have legalized cannabis, including how to keep the drug 
away from teenagers and prevent people from driving under its influence.”); Vivian Wang & Jeffery 
C. Mays, Black Lawmakers to Block Legalized Marijuana in N.Y. if Their Communities Don’t Benefit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/nyregion/marijuana-legalization-
african-americans.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article 
[http://perma.cc/B6MZ-CKQD] (noting that black legislators in New York would withhold support for 
an adult-use legislation bill unless they were “assured that some of that money will go toward job 
training programs, and that minority entrepreneurs will receive licenses to cultivate or sell the 
marijuana.”). 
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understandable confusion about its legality because of its still-unchanged treatment 
under the CSA.97 When state and federal laws conflict, courts must determine 
whether federal law can coexist with or overrides the state law under the Supremacy 
Clause.98 Congress can preempt states’ laws either expressly or implicitly depending 
on the text of the statute and the extent of federal activity in the sector.99 Courts, 
however, assume “that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”100 
But the conflict between the CSA and state marijuana laws is not a simple 
preemption analysis.101 The CSA explicitly states that it does not preempt state law 
“unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that 
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”102 Such a provision 
makes logical sense because an act can be legal under state law while illegal under 
federal law or vice versa.103 
Further, the federal government cannot compel the states to adopt or enforce 
federal law without violating the Tenth Amendment.104 While the federal 
government may still criminalize marijuana, it relies on the states to enforce criminal 
penalties: “of the nearly 900,000 marijuana arrests in 2012, arrests made at the state 
and local level dwarfed those made by federal officials by a ratio of 109 to 1.”105 If 
the federal government wants to deter an action—such as marijuana use—but is in 
disagreement with the states, “the proper response . . . is to ratchet up the federal 
regulatory regime, not to commandeer that of the state.”106 
 
97   Michael Cole, Note, Functional Preemption: An Explanation of How State Medicinal 
Marijuana Laws can Coexist with the Controlled Substances Act, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 557, 
575 (2012) (“It can be confusing for the layperson to understand this lawyerly distinction between state 
and federal criminal laws and preemption.”). 
98   U.S. CONST. Article VI, Clause 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” 
99   Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
100  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cole, supra note 97, at 562. 
101  Erwin Chemerinsky et al, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 74, 90–91 (2015). 
102  21 U.S.C.A. § 903(1970); see Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 105–06 (discussing Section 
903 as requiring something more than “mere speculation about a hypothetical conflict”). 
103  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005); Zettler, supra note 7, at 862. 
104  Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 111 (“Just as the federal government cannot command the 
state to create a law criminalizing conduct, neither can it command the state to leave current state laws 
on the books.” (footnotes omitted)). 
105  Id. at 84 (“After the CSA’s passage, marijuana was prohibited in all fifty states. In fact, state 
marijuana laws provide the basis for nearly every marijuana arrest in the country.”). 
106  Id. at 112 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002)).  
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Many of the issues raised in this situation are due to indirect conflicts, not direct 
conflicts, that are outside a preemption analysis. In other words, the conflict is not 
the immediate criminal act; rather, it is the subsequent consequences arising from an 
act that is legal according to one level of government (the states) but illegal to the 
other (the federal government). If the federal government determines that anyone 
who has committed a federal crime is ineligible for a federal benefit, that is not a 
“conflict” that the states can resolve. Thus, the conflicts arise due to the civil—not 
punitive—consequences of carrying out an act that is illegal federally.107 Because 
those providing and those using marijuana are violating federal law, they may risk 
losing their access to financial, accounting, legal, and other services because these 
service providers could be seen as aiding and abetting an unlawful act in the eyes of 
the federal government.108 Just as the federal government cannot force states to adopt 
similar punitive policies toward the use of marijuana, states’ legalization of 
marijuana use cannot prevent the federal government from making the political 
decision to use such a violation of federal law as a disqualifier for federal benefits.109 
 
C. Modest Federal Efforts to Resolve State-Federal Conflicts 
 
In contrast to tremendous state activity following the California ballot initiative, 
less change has occurred at the federal level since the CSA passed fifty years ago.110 
Several high-profile members of the 116th Congress have introduced legislation on 
marijuana legalization,111 but there has been little movement on these proposals in 
either the Democratic-controlled House or Republican-controlled Senate.112 
Congressional action on marijuana reform has been modest. For example, in 
 
107  Fertig, supra note 6. 
108  Fertig, supra note 6, at 9–11, 15–20; see generally Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at Section 
II; Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R45074, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug 
Offenses 12–13 (2018) (discussing how those who assist criminal sales may be subject to penalties). 
109  Chemerinsky, supra note 104, at 79. 
110  When a majority of states adopt a similar position—even if that position is in contrast to 
federal law—it can provide political cover for federal policymakers to amend federal law to be 
consistent with the states. Kim, supra note 13, at 94 (noting how state right-to-try laws helped usher a 
change to federal regulations around access to experimental drugs). 
111  Justin Strekal, 4/20: Will Congress advance marijuana legislation in 2019? THE HILL (Apr. 
20, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/439806-4-20-will-congress-advance-marijuana-
legislation-in-2019 (“As of this writing, members of Congress have introduced five separate bills to 
end the federal prohibition of marijuana. In addition, there are also more than half a dozen bills pending 
before Congress that seek to restrain the federal enforcement of cannabis prohibition in states that have 
reformed their marijuana laws.”). 
112  See, e.g., Caitlyn Kim, After Years of Stalemate, Federal Cannabis Legislation Finds 
Traction in Congress, CPR (July 22, 2019), http://www.cpr.org/2019/07/22/after-years-of-stalemate-
federal-cannabis-legislation-finds-traction-in-congress/ [http://perma.cc/EY8C-CPW5]. The 
Marijuana Policy Project lists a dozen bills—with several having bipartisan support—in the current 
116th Congress. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, Several marijuana-related bills filed in new 
Congress, (Sept. 25, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/policy/federal/ [http://perma.cc/5PR4-DUXJ]. 
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the 2016 Farm Bill, Congress amended the CSA to exclude “hemp” from the 
statutory definition of marijuana.113 In this year of the CSA’s fiftieth anniversary, 
Congress looked poised to consider adopting  a “safe harbor” for financial 
institutions to do business with state-licensed marijuana companies and businesses 
that support them.114 
Congress has intervened in the area of federal enforcement of the CSA. Given 
the supremacy of federal law, the Supreme Court has held that state legalization does 
not prohibit federal enforcement of the CSA, even on wholly intrastate activities, 
 
113  Agriculture Improvement Act, Pub.L. 115-334, § 12619 (2018). For additional political 
context, see John Hudak, The Farm Bill, hemp legalization and the status of CBD: An explainer, 
BROOKINGS FIXGOV (Dec. 14, 2018), www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/14/the-farm-bill-
hemp-and-cbd-explainer. 
114  Kamin, supra note 6, at 620 (“In addition, anyone conspiring with or aiding and abetting 
those violating federal law are equally liable for a violation of federal law. This includes, at least in 
principle, anyone leasing space to marijuana businesses, working for or contracting with them, or 
providing basic services such as accounting, banking, financial, and legal services.”) (footnotes 
omitted). The House passed the Secure And Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act, H.R. 1595, 116th 
Cong. (2019), and included this bill language in a coronavirus-relief package, Section 110606, H.R. 
6800, 116th Cong. (2020). In 2019, Senator Mike Crapo, the chairman of the Senate Banking 
Committee, planned to consider similar legislation, but no action has been taken. Zachary Warmbrodt, 
Crapo plans landmark cannabis banking vote, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2019, 5:02 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/13/crapo-cannabis-banking-vote-1729925 
[http://perma.cc/5GHD-J7NM] (noting the committee chairman’s interest “because of questions 
surrounding transactions with other businesses, like plumbers and hardware stores, that provide 
services to the marijuana industry”). Interestingly, Crapo represents a state that does not allow for either 
medical or recreational marijuana. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, 2020 medical marijuana ballot 
petition approved for circulation, (Aug. 15, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/idaho/ 
[http://perma.cc/8KMU-8G2T]. 
Prospects for SAFE being passed into law seem unlikely. Kyle Jaeger, Mitch McConnell And 
Other GOP Lawmakers Slam Marijuana Banking Provisions In Coronavirus Bill, MARIJUANA 
MOMENT (May 14, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/mitch-mcconnell-and-other-gop-
lawmakers-slam-marijuana-banking-provisions-in-coronavirus-bill/ (discussing the Senate majority’s 
opposition to the House provision); Natalie Fertig, Coronavirus spells doom for federal cannabis 
legislation, POLITICO (May 12, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/12/coronavirus-
cannabis-legislation-252313 (noting little activity on many legislation related to cannabis, including 
the banking bill). Further, some advocates have raised concerns about addressing the financial issues 
of the marijuana industry without also addressing some of the systemic issues caused by the federal 
criminalization of marijuana. See Natalie Fertig et al., Advocates ask Pelosi, Hoyer to press pause on 
cannabis banking, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-
cannabis-preview/2019/09/18/advocates-ask-pelosi-hoyer-to-press-pause-on-cannabis-banking-
478449 [http://perma.cc/4JTP-FFH9]; see also Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., to 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. H.R., and Steny Hoyer, Majority Leader, U.S. H.R. (Sept. 17, 2019), 
http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016d-41d0-db25-a77d-5fd3acdc0000. In 2020, the COVID-19 
pandemic overwhelmed other advocacy issues, delaying debates over marijuana legalization. Kristine 
Owram, Reconsidering Pot’s ‘Teaspoon’ of Tax Revenue: Cannabis Weekly, BLOOMBERG 
GOVERNMENT (Apr. 27, 2020) (noting that market analysts predict “there’s less than 25% odds that any 
[federal] cannabis legislation will be enacted into law this year”). 
76   OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  Vol: 18.1:61 
such as a patient growing a small amount of marijuana for personal consumption.115 
To clarify its policy on marijuana prosecutions,116 the Obama administration issued 
guidance in 2013 to federal prosecutors to avoid prosecuting marijuana cases in 
states with a robust regulatory system for marijuana.117 Congress initially rejected 
an amendment to prohibit the Justice Department from prosecuting those involved 
in state medical marijuana initiatives, but the amendment’s sponsor successfully 
included it in an appropriations bill for the first time in 2014.118 So far, Congress has 
continued to include the same prohibition in the appropriations bill that funds the 
Justice Department.119 
 
III. LEARNING FROM OTHER MOVEMENTS 
 
Despite this widening divide between state and federal treatment of marijuana, 
federal policymakers have done little to bridge this policy gap. But the states and 
advocates could look at other recently passed laws that demonstrate an interest in 
reforming drug policy, in some cases spurred by states’ collective action.120 The 
following section discusses how these recent laws are illustrative of potential paths 
to amending the CSA’s treatment of marijuana. 
 
A. Political Realism: Is Congress Ready to Legalize? 
 
Given the federalism challenges, Congress is the appropriate actor to address 
the conflict between state and federal policy regarding marijuana.121 With the 
 
115  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005). 
116  Kamin, supra note 6, at 628–30 (discussing initial inconsistencies in the Obama Justice 
Department toward prosecution of marijuana cases). 
117  Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013). 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions subsequently reversed this guidance. Infra note 208. 
118  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113–235 (2015). 
(passing the amendment by a 219–189 vote on May 30, 2014, the House subsequently included it in 
Section 538 of Division B). 
119  Cong. Research Serv., R44782, The Marijuana Policy Gap and the Path Forward 15 (2017). 
At the time of drafting this article, Congress had not yet passed appropriations bills for the next federal 
fiscal year. See Sarah Ferris and Heather Caygle, Pandemic jumbles House agenda, Politico (May 25, 
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/25/coronavirus-house-agenda-273819 (noting that 
Congress had yet to act on “annual chores like crafting spending legislation” due to the COVID-19 
pandemic and other issues).  
120  Collective state action may be the catalyst for change at the federal level. See Kim, supra 
note 13, at 102 (discussing how, after a majority of states passed language authorizing a “right to try” 
experimental drugs, Congress entered into the policy space to pass a federal version of such a “right”). 
121  Wallack & Hudak, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 208 (noting it is false to 
argue “that the President can reschedule marijuana with a stroke of the pen”); see also Zettler, supra 
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public’s attitude toward drug policy and criminal justice seemingly changing, the 
disparate state landscape on marijuana, and successful popular referendums (for at 
least medical, if not recreational, purposes), it would seem that the time would be 
ripe for Congress to respond by amending the CSA, particularly in the Democratic-
controlled House.122 
Given recent polling,123 observers might assume that the public is ahead of 
policymakers in being ready to advance marijuana legalization. The issue polls well 
with the general public, and when presented as a ballot measure—and thus bypassing 
the politicians—legalization efforts have generally, but not always, been 
successful.124 
But there are important caveats to this political assumption. First, ballot 
measures are not available in all states or at the federal level and also may fail to 
address some of the complex, historical issues related to equity that might be better 
handled through legislation.125 Even more telling, several states with progressive 
political environments have failed to pass legislation to legalize marijuana, 
suggesting that there still remain many barriers based on law, policy, politics, and 
 
note 7, at 850–51 (noting that states may pass “even ineffectual laws and regulations” in order to spur 
federal action). 
And of course, advocates would need to go through Congress for a legislative solution as there 
is no federal equivalent to the state ballot initiatives. Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 171 (noting the 
importance of ballot initiatives to provide “a means for public opinion to be heard and invoked” in the 
absence of legislative activity). 
122  Indeed, a key committee chairman claimed that marijuana legalization would be one of the 
first items on the majority’s agenda at the start of the new Congress. Kyle Jaeger, House Will Vote To 
End Federal Marijuana Prohibition Within ‘Weeks,’ Key Chairman Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 
27, 2019), http://www.marijuanamoment.net/house-will-vote-to-end-federal-marijuana-prohibition-
within-weeks-key-chairman-says/ [http://perma.cc/BC3L-Z8PR] (interviewing House Rules 
Chairman, Jim McGovern, who predicted a vote on legislation to grant states an exemption from the 
CSA “in a relatively short time, within the next several weeks”). A month later, the then-ranking 
member of the House Judiciary Committee complained of the lack of progress on the issue. Tom 
Angell, Top GOP Congressman Presses Democratic Majority To Pass Marijuana Bill, FORBES (Apr. 
4, 2019), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2019/04/04/top-gop-congressman-presses-democra 
tic-majority-to-pass-marijuana-bill/#1ef04b88faa9. 
123  Hartig, & Geiger, supra note 5. 
124  See, e.g., Tom Angell, Marijuana Won The Midterm Elections, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018, 11:10 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/11/07/marijuana-won-the-midterm-elections/#453 
589c93a91 [http://perma.cc/8W7F-BQFD] (“[O]ne clear winner in the midterm elections was 
marijuana.”). But see supra note 89 (noting the failure of a referendum in North Dakota). 
125  Ferraiolo, supra note 19, at 171 (“Policy change in the states has not led to federal reform. 
Rather, two factors—the ballot initiative (which provided a means for public opinion to be heard and 
invoked) and policy entrepreneurs’ framing efforts (which emphasized a medical, compassionate image 
of marijuana and its users)—have allowed the coexistence of two different policy images and 
approaches.”). 
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equity that remain unresolved. For example, some of these high-profile failures may 
not have been solely about whether to legalize marijuana for adult use.126 Rather, 
some legislators may have withheld their votes because of  the failure to address 
complex issues such as whether the communities that have been most devastated by 
the legacy of the CSA should be able to share in the economic benefits that legal 
sales might bring.127 
Second, while polling finds general support, a closer look reveals differences 
based on partisan identification and religious affiliation that make it less likely that 
Republican legislators would support legalization efforts.128 For instance, a 2018 
Pew poll found that, while the general public supported legalization 62% to 34%, 
Republican voters were far less likely to support it than Democrats or even 
independents who generally leaned in favor of Republican policies.129 Further, white 
Evangelicals and Catholics were more likely to oppose legalization while “mainline” 
Protestants and unaffiliated individuals were more likely to support it.130 Similarly, 
a poll in New York, shortly after the legalization effort failed, found that, while a 
majority of the public (55% to 40%) supported such a policy, most Republican 
voters opposed it (40% to 53%).131 Thus, Republican lawmakers may be less 
inclined to support marijuana legalization if their base supporters oppose such 
policies.132 
 
126  Supra note 93 (noting related issues around the expungement of prior felonies, changes to 
the existing medical marijuana program, and political infighting hampered legislative efforts in New 
Jersey). 
127  Wang & Mays, supra note 96 (noting a disagreement between legislators and the New York 
governor over how to invest any revenue derived from recreational sales with one legislator arguing, 
“I’m not willing to create a market that will allow existing wealthy people to gain wealth and leave out 
the people that I represent.”). 
128  See, e.g., Warmbrodt, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (noting that Banking 
Committee Chairman Crapo is open to considering legislation allowing banks to work with marijuana 
businesses, but does not support amending the CSA to legalize marijuana); Fertig, supra note 6, at 4 
(“Republican lawmakers who . . . come from states with medical or recreational cannabis are the best 
bet for cannabis allies”). 
129  Hartig & Geiger, supra note 5 (“Republicans are divided, with 45% in favor of legalizing 
marijuana and 51% opposed. Still, the share of Republicans saying marijuana should be legal has 
increased from 39% in 2015. Independents who lean toward the Republican Party are far more likely 
than Republicans to favor marijuana legalization (59% vs. 45%).”). 
130  Id. (surveying Evangelicals (52% opposed, 43% support), Catholics (44% opposed, 52% 
support), white mainline Protestants (31% opposed, 64% support), unaffiliated (19% opposed, 79% 
support)). 
131SIENA COLL. RES. INST., Voters on End of Session Agenda: ‘Yes’ on Marijuana (55–40%), 
(June 10, 2019), http://scri.siena.edu/2019/06/10/voters-on-end-of-session-agenda-yes-on-marijuana-
55-40/ [http://perma.cc/8UFY-93BJ]. 
132  Fertig, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that “more Democrats support cannabis legislation in both 
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B. Recent Laws as Signs of Change 
 
Although our current political gridlock seems worse than even the environment 
fifty years ago that produced the CSA, policymakers from opposing political 
philosophies have come together to pass legislation on drug access, substance abuse, 
and criminal justice in recent years.133 For instance, Congress passed legislation134 
that seemingly allows greater patient access to drugs still in the experimental process 
and not yet approved by the FDA—legislation that was inspired by overwhelming 
endorsement by the states.135 Additionally, Congress actually passed legislation 
focused on the country’s opioid epidemic, not once, but twice: the Comprehensive 
Addiction and Recovery Act136 (CARA) in 2016, and then the Substance Use-
Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for 
Patients and Communities Act137 in 2018. The relative ease by which Congress 
passed these bills, as well as the more-difficult passage of the criminal justice reform 
bill, the First Step Act,138 might signal a policy shift and a change in political 
attitudes toward drug policy and criminalization that harkens back to the original 
compromises in the CSA in its approach to drug policy. The question is whether this 
shift is enough to consider amending the CSA regarding its treatment of marijuana. 
 
1. The Right to Try: An Example of How States Can Influence Federal Drug 
Policy 
 
In an area of drug policy that may be instructive, the so-called “right to try,” 
which provides a pathway for terminally ill patients to request experimental drugs 
not yet approved by the FDA, moved federally due in large part to actions at the 
 
the House and Senate than Republicans,” and such Republican supporters tend to “have a history of 
being pro-states rights or come from states with medical or recreational cannabis”). 
133  Id. at 12. 
134  Right to Try Act, P.L. 115-176 (2018). 
135  Kim, supra note 13, at 102–06. 
136  Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–198, 130 Stat. 695 
(2016). 
137  Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for 
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115–721, 132 Stat. 3894 (2016).  
138  First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Although initial versions 
of this bill used the acronym FIRST STEP (which stood for “Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society 
Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person”), this paper will use the short title contained in the 
final version that passed into law. 
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state level.139 “While Congress and the public have demanded greater regulatory 
authority during times of crises, the pendulum has swung toward deregulation when 
stakeholders and policymakers feel that the FDA’s process has slowed or even 
blocked access to life-saving medicine.”140 Similar to advocates for legalizing 
marijuana, right-to-try advocates tried and failed to obtain administrative, 
legislative, and judicial relief at the federal level and instead turned to states for 
policy change.141 
Beginning with Colorado in 2014, a majority of states enacted  right-to-try laws, 
which follow model legislation drafted by the libertarian Goldwater Institute.142 One 
draft of the Goldwater model legislation is explicitly critical of the FDA drug 
approval process: “The use of available investigational drugs, biological products, 
and devices is a decision that should be made by the patient with a terminal disease 
in consultation with his or her physician not a decision to be made by the 
government.”143 
The states’ laws contained several structural flaws that make effectuating the 
right to try difficult. The model right-to-try legislation explicitly does not mandate 
drug makers to actually provide the experimental drug.144 Even if the company does 
agree to supply the patient with the drug, the company can charge the patient for all 
costs associated with the experimental drug, and the legislation explicitly states the 
patient’s insurer is not required to cover any costs associated with the experimental 
 
139  Kim, supra note 13, at 102–06. 
140  Id. at 97–98. 
141  Id. at 98–108. 
142  GOLDWATER INST., Right to Try Model Legislation, https://respectfulinsolence.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/GoldwaterInstituteRighttoTryModel.pdf, [hereinafter “Model Legislation”]. 
Note that there have been prior attempts to legislate greater access to experimental drugs. Susan Okie, 
Access before Approval – A Right to Take Experimental Drugs? 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 437, 439 
(2006), (discussing a 2005 U.S. Senate bill that would allow terminally ill to obtain any drug that had 
gone through the first phase of clinical trials). Under the model legislation, patients are only eligible 
for this statutory-created “right” if they meet certain criteria: the patient must be suffering from an 
“[a]dvanced illness . . . that, without life-sustaining procedures, will soon result in death;” have 
consulted with a physician and considered all other options currently approved by the FDA; have been 
given a prescription or a recommendation from a physician for an experimental drug; and have given 
written informed consent to take the experimental drug. Model Legislation, supra at section 1. The 
model does allow the drug maker to charge for any costs associated with the production of the 
experimental drug. Id. at Section 2. The FDA also limits what a drug maker can charge for experimental 
drugs in a clinical trial. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2009). Lastly, the model provides immunity for health 
professionals from the relevant licensing boards for recommending, prescribing, or administering the 
experimental drug. Model Legislation, supra at section 5. 
143  CHRISTINA CORIERI, GOLDWATER INST. “Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering 
the Terminally Ill to Take Control of their Treatment,” 266 (11 February 2014) (proposing legislative 
findings for a bill). 
144  Model Legislation, supra note 142, at Section 2. 
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drug.145 Given these high hurdles, it is not clear if any patient actually has been aided 
by a state right-to-try law.146 
Second, a state statute can accomplish only so much in an area as heavily 
regulated by the federal government as the drug approval and marketing process.147 
Where the federal government and the states may disagree on the legality of 
marijuana without a dispute over federal preemption, there is less certainty about 
whether state right-to-try laws are preempted by the FDA as its regulatory powers 
over commercial sales of prescription drugs are quite extensive.148 Prior to a federal 
law being enacted, proponents would argue that state right-to-try laws 
complemented, rather than conflicted with, the FDA process and thus were not 
preempted.149 
But the overwhelming response in the states set the stage for a federal law to 
address any legal ambiguity.150 The same political forces that influenced efforts at 
the state level have moved Congress to pressure the FDA to revise its 
compassionate-use policy and to pass a bill that created a federal right to try in 
2017.151 Although the federal Right to Try law explicitly retained the compassionate-
 
145  Id. at sections 2–3 and 7. 
146  NYU LANGONE HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON COMPASSIONATE USE AND PRE-APPROVAL 
ACCESS, Statement from the NYU Langone Health Working Group on Compassionate Use and Pre-
Approval Access, https://med.nyu.edu/pophealth/sites/default/files/pophealth/CUPA%20statement% 
20031518.pdf (Mar. 15, 2018) (noting that right-to-try proponents could only identify one example of 
a physician using a state law to treat patients; however, the product being used was made available by 
the existing FDA process); see also Kim, supra note 13, at 11 n.56 (referring to an earlier statement by 
the NYU Langone Health Working Group on Compassionate Use and Pre-Approval Access that “[t}o 
the best of our knowledge, no patients have been spared from death by right to try laws.”). 
147  Caitlyn Martin, Questioning the “Right” in State Right to Try Laws: Assessing the Legality 
and Effectiveness of These Laws, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 159, 178–81 (2016) (discussing express and implied 
preemption of state laws particularly in the CONTEXT of regulating drugs); see also PLIVA v Mensing, 
564 U.S. 604, 611–24 (2011) (finding that federal regulations on generic drug labelling preempted a 
state tort claim). There are examples, however, of state regulatory efforts (often in the area of product 
liability or medical practice) that challenge the conventional wisdom of federal preemption in this area. 
Zettler, supra note 7, at 861–88 (discussing different state regulatory schemes, including the right to 
try, that were justified under traditional state powers of regulating product liability and the practice of 
medicine). 
148  Kim, supra note 13, at 103–04. 
149  Martin, supra note 147, at 182–83 (“Right to Try laws, however, remove safeguards 
governing the accessibility of drugs by circumventing the FDA altogether.”); Ellen Black, State ‘Right 
to Try’ Acts: A Good Start, but a Federal Act is Necessary, 45 SW. L. REV. 719, 743 (2016) (“As many 
legal scholars have argued, it appears likely that the right to try acts are impliedly preempted by the 
FDA regulations.”). 
150  Black, supra note 149, at 751–52; see also Barrett, supra note 7 (discussing how states can 
signal disapproval of federal decisions in areas where they are prevented from legislating). 
151  Right to Try Act, S. 204, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter “S. 204”]. The legislation’s 
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use process, 152 it created a new national process for patients to request access from 
a drug maker directly without seeking FDA approval.  
The potential conflict between states’ drug policies and federal law is an 
obvious shared policy challenge between the right to try and marijuana legalization. 
While the initial state laws on the right to try could not change the federal drug 
approval process and may have been on questionable legal and policy grounds, they 
provided a successful foundation for political pressure on Congress to enact a 
statutory change.153 Similarly, states’ treatment of marijuana—particularly for 
medicinal purposes—parallels states’ treatment of experimental drugs.154 And 
similar to the patient stories used to support the right to try, marijuana advocates 
effectively used the stories of patients with cancer and AIDS to sway voters during 
the early ballot initiatives.155 
Marijuana legalization also shares another parallel with the right to try: both 
marijuana and experimental drugs lack a strong medical and scientific evidence 
base.156 While the weight of scholarly research favors legalizing marijuana,157 the 
actual medical research is not entirely conclusive, in large part because federal law 
makes such research extremely difficult to conduct.158 With the right to try, there is 
a similar challenge since the drugs are experimental—obviously, not enough is 
known about them and, hence, the need for clinical trials to study their effectiveness. 
 
sponsor, Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, has had a long-standing interest in the right to try. See 
Connecting Patients to New and Potential Life Saving Treatments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ 
hearings/conecting-patients-to-new-and-potential-life-saving-treatments (hosting a hearing on access 
to experimental drugs). Johnson used a procedural mechanism to hold up a reauthorization of the 
FDA’s user fee program in order to pass his bill through the Senate. Sarah Karlin-Smith & Seung Min 
Kim, Senate Approves ‘Right-to-Try’ Drug Bill, POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.politico.com 
/story/2017/08/03/senate-right-to-try-drug-bill-241293. 
152  S. 204, supra note 151, at § 3(4) (stating that the Johnson bill “is consistent with, and will 
act as an alternative pathway alongside, existing expanded access policies”). 
153  Kim, supra note 13, at 102–08. 
154  Zettler, supra note 7, at 879 (noting that “state medical marijuana laws represent an attempt 
to permit access to medicine outside of the FDA approval process”). 
155  The parallel of course begins to diverge when marijuana use becomes recreational rather than 
helping those who are ill and in pain. See supra notes 70–74. 
156  Zettler, supra note 7, at 878 (noting “the paucity of high-quality data supporting many 
medical uses of marijuana”). 
157  ROBERT HARDAWAY, MARIJUANA POLITICS: UNCOVERING THE TROUBLESOME HISTORY AND 
SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIMINALIZATION 3 (2018) (noting in researching his book, one scholar found “10 
times more scholarly articles advocating marijuana legalization . . . than articles opposing them”). 
158  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF 
CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
RESEARCH 25–26 (2017). https://www.nap.edu/read/24625/chapter/3. 
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Because of this uncertainty, many ethicists, scientists, former regulatory officials, 
and even patient and consumer groups raised policy and ethical concerns about the 
creation of a federal right to try.159 Additionally, ethicists and health professionals 
argue that right-to-try laws create false expectations for patients, especially since 
patients may not realize even under right-to-try laws, “[d]rug companies don't have 
to give them the medicine, and insurance companies don’t have to pay for it.”160 
Such concerns, though, did not stop Congress from passing a federal right to try. 
 
2. The Opioid Response: A Return to Public Health Approaches Toward 
Addiction Policy 
 
Another stream of federal drug policy—including how we respond to those 
misusing controlled substances—is our country’s response to the opioid epidemic. 
Over the last twenty years, Americans’ use of opioids has increased dramatically: 
the sales of prescription opioids nearly quadrupled since 1999 due to several 
potential causes.161 At the same time, the death rate due to overdoses tripled to 19.8 
 
159  Rachel Roubein, Patient Groups Criticize ‘Right to Try’ Bill on Experimental Drugs, THE 
HILL (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/378127-patient-groups-
criticize-right-to-try-bill-on-experimental-drugs (noting that more than 75 patient organizations wrote 
congressional leadership opposing right-to-try legislation); Andy Taylor & Alison Bateman-House, 
Right to Try Misses the Real Issue. There is Another Solution, THE HILL (Dec. 12, 2016), 4:50 PM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/311259-right-to-try-misses-the-real-issue-there-is-
another-solution (discussing opposition in the patient and research community for ethical and scientific 
reasons). 
160  Carrie Feibel, Patients Demand The ‘Right To Try’ Experimental Drugs, But Costs Can Be 
Steep, NPR SHOTS (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:17 PM), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/03/ 
03/517796956/patients-demand-the-right-to-try-experimental-drugs-but-costs-can-be-steep; NYU 
LANGONE HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON COMPASSIONATE USE AND PRE-APPROVAL ACCESS, supra note 
146 (“Right to try does nothing to increase affordability of experimental medicines: in fact, the 
legislation specifically states that insurers do not have to pay for investigational medical products.”). 
S. 204 § 2(b) references FDA regulations, 21 CFR § 312(d)(1), that allow a drug maker to recover 
“direct costs” for supplying an experimental drug. S. 204, supra note 151; 21 C.F.R. § 312,8(d)(1). 
Patients seeking aid through the right to try are in a very different situation than those in clinical 
trials, which may provide statutory protections and contractual guarantees. Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-8 (2010); Insurance Coverage and Clinical Trials, NAT’L CANCER INST. 
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/clinical-trials/paying/insurance 
(require insurers to cover routine costs such as physician and hospital visits for patients in clinical 
trials.). Some states have similar insurance mandates. Kelly Johnson, Payers Still Denying Coverage 
Despite Clinical Trial Mandate, ONCLIVE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.onclive.com/publications/ 
oncology-business-news/2016/april-2016/payers-still-denying-coverage-despite-clinical-trial-
mandate?p=2. Other costs—such as procedures, tests, and therapies specifically related to the clinical 
trial—generally are covered by the drug maker or the sponsor of the clinical trial. Id. Some providers, 
however, have argued insurers are not following this mandate. Christine Mackay et al, Insurance 
Denials for Cancer Clinical Trial Participation After the Affordable Care Act Mandate, 123 CANCER 
2893 (2017). 
161  Claire Felter, The U.S. Opioid Epidemic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
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per 100,000 individuals, with nearly two-thirds of these deaths involving either 
prescription or illegal opioids.162 Deaths due to opioid overdoses exceed automobile 
accidents in the United States.163 The opioid epidemic’s toll on the American 
public’s health is so extensive that it is linked to a decline in the country’s life 
expectancy.164 In addition to the loss of life, the opioid epidemic has had other public 
health consequences: nearly two million Americans have a prescription opioid use 
disorder,165 leading to an increase in illicit opioid use and to diseases such as hepatitis 
C and HIV.166 
Because CARA was introduced just before the 2014 midterm elections, there 
was little chance that it would pass into law. However, advocates responded 
positively to the legislators’ interest and began to plan for its passage in the next 
Congress.167 Tragically, “the dramatic increase in opioid-related overdose deaths in 
virtually every Congressional district in America” created momentum to pass the 
bill and address an issue that had changed from a regional concern to a national 
epidemic.168 When CARA was signed into law on July 22, 2016, only months before 
the federal election, advocates hailed it as the “first major federal addiction 
legislation in 40 years and the most comprehensive effort undertaken to address the 
opioid epidemic, encompassing all six pillars necessary for such a coordinated 




vt-y1MMpnTzTGwY6toaAuF_EALw_wcB [http://perma.cc/D4MH-FSMJ] (last updated Sept. 17, 
2019). 
162  Holly Hedegaard et al., Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2016, 294 NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT. 5 (2017), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/6JQU-XC7J]. 
163  Ken Kolosh, Accidental Injury Becomes #3 Cause of Death in the U.S., NAT’L SAFETY 
COUNCIL (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.nsc.org/safety-first-blog/accidental-injury-becomes-3-cause-of-
death-in-the-us-1 [http://perma.cc/4VVS-QM7F]. 
164  Felter, supra note 161. 
165  Opioid Overdose Crisis, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, (May 27, 2020), 
166  Felter, supra note 161. 
167  Sensenbrenner, Scott, Marino, Bass, Joyce, Ryan Introduce Comprehensive Legislation to 
Combat Drug Addiction, CONGRESSMAN BOBBY SCOTT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://sensenbrenner. 
house.gov/2014/12/sensenbrenner-scott-marino-bass-joyce-ryan-introduce-comprehensive-
legislation-to-combat-drug-addiction (noting that the bill had been endorsed by 93 national 
organizations). 
168  Jeremiah Gardner & Robert Ashford, CARA History & Breakdown, HAZELDEN BETTY FORD 
FOUND. (July 11, 2016), http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/articles/gardner/cara-history-and-
breakdown [http://perma.cc/Z53T-9SUS]. 
2020   PREEMPTION UP IN SMOKE  85 
reform, and overdose reversal.”169 
CARA mirrored some of the original promises of the CSA. First, CARA 
contained numerous public-health approaches to combating the opioid epidemic. In 
addition to a general grant program for community-based organizations,170 CARA 
also increased access points for community-based treatment,171 training for first 
responders,172 grants targeted at addiction treatment for pregnant and postpartum 
women,173 and the types of health professionals who could prescribe medications to 
treat opioid misuse disorders.174 Second, CARA contained several grants aimed at 
improving law enforcement responses—including for state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement to pursue innovative approaches to policing,175—and for states to 
establish prescription drug monitoring programs.176 Third, CARA reformed 
processes at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to address how the VA health 
system treats pain and prescribes opioids.177 
A little over two years after CARA’s passage, Congress revisited the opioid 
epidemic, passing SUPPORT and sending it to President Trump for signature.178 
Although the opioid epidemic was still raging, a cynic might question whether a 
second bill was needed so quickly or whether SUPPORT was meant to give 
Republicans a healthcare achievement prior to the 2018 midterm elections. Prior to 
the passage of SUPPORT, Congressional Republicans had spent a year attempting 
to repeal the ACA but failed to send legislation to President Trump for signature.179 
 
169  The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), CMTY. ANTI-DRUG COALS. OF AM., 
http://www.cadca.org/comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
170  Id. at §§ 103, 601. 
171  Id. at §§ 107, 110. 
172  Id. at § 202. 
173  Id. at §§ 501, 503. 
174  Id. at § 303. 
175  Id. at § 201. 
176  Id. at § 109. 
177  Id. at Title IX. 
178  See Devin Miller, Opioids Bill Becomes Law; AAP Advances Key Priorities, AAP NEWS 
(Nov. 20, 2018), http://www.aappublications.org/news/2018/11/20/washington112018 [http:// 
perma.cc/NL9S-J2G9]. 
179  See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, 
NEWSWEEK: U.S. (July 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-
and-replace-70-failed-attempts-643832 [http://perma.cc/V43T-BL4C] (noting that Trump called on 
Senate Republicans via Twitter to continue to push forward on repeal efforts). 
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SUPPORT faced some of the same criticisms related to sustainable funding as 
CARA did.180 But whereas CARA seemed to have some logical themes in its 
legislative structure,181 some criticized SUPPORT as “scattershot compared with 
what is needed.”182 Some legislators expressed concern that the process for 
developing SUPPORT was “rushed,”183 as the House considered many different 
proposals that were ultimately packaged into a single bill.184 House Energy and 
Commerce then-Ranking Member Frank Pallone worried that many of the bills that 
would ultimately be packaged as SUPPORT lacked meaningful review.185 But by 
the 2018 midterm elections, sponsoring legislation aimed at the opioid epidemic 
seemed politically astute.186 Although advocates criticized the legislation because 
 
180  See Abby Goodnough, In Rare Bipartisan Accord, House and Senate Reach Compromise on 
Opioid Bill, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/health/opioid-bill-
congress.html [http://perma.cc/H9PK-5JLB] (quoting a researcher who stated, “Compared to how we 
responded to AIDS, it’s a failure,” but that Congress “didn’t want to spend, so they agreed on every 
second-tier issue they could.”). During the legislative debate, Ranking Member Rep. Pallone noted, 
“The reality is that meaningful policy in this space may cost money, and agreement on appropriate 
offsets that do not harm people—including the very people that we may be trying to help—is a critical 
component needed in order for me to support these bills moving forward.” See Frank Pallone, Jr., 
Pallone’s Opening Remarks at Health Subcommittee Markup of Opioid Legislation, HOUSE COMM. ON 
ENERGY & COM. (Apr. 25, 2018), http://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-
s-opening-remarks-at-health-subcommittee-markup-of-opioid [http://perma.cc/XSL8-FUXF]. 
181  CADCA, supra note 169. 
182  Goodnough, supra note 180. 
183  Pallone, supra note 180 (Pallone noted that the committee was considering at least 63 bills 
in “the Chairman’s extremely hasty timeframe to pass opioid legislation.”). 
184  Proponents grouped SUPPORT’s provisions into “four buckets: advancing treatment and 
recovery initiatives, improving prevention, protecting our communities, and bolstering efforts to fight 
deadly illicit synthetic drugs such as fentanyl.” Greg Walden, Thanks to Congress, We’re Making Real 
Progress in the Opioid Crisis, WASH. EXAMINER (June 22, 2019, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/thanks-to-congress-were-making-real-progress-
in-the-opioid-crisis [http://perma.cc/T4CE-GTCV] (writing, in an editorial, an overview of 
SUPPORT). But see Katie Zezima & Colby Itkowitz, Flailing on Fentanyl, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 
2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/fentanyl-epidemic-congress/? 
wpisrc=al_news__alert-politics--alert-national&wpmk=1 [http://perma.cc/X9JK-DWT4] (discussing 
congressional failures to recognize the increasing dangers of the synthetic opioid fentanyl). 
185  Pallone, supra note 180 (“These forced time constraints mean that some bills suffer from 
lack of technical assistance from our federal agencies or a CBO analysis. Additionally, and equally 
important, stakeholders have not had the opportunity to adequately evaluate these bills or weigh in on 
their impact.”). 
186  See Brianna Ehley & Jennifer Haberkorn, Tough Reelection? Sponsor an Opioid Bill, 
POLITICO (June 16, 2018, 6:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/16/lawmakers-opioid-
bills-midterms-624926 [http://perma.cc/URD8-XG5H]; see also Zezima & Itkowitz, supra note 184 
(interviewing the House Republican sponsor of bill to increase sentencing minimums for trafficking 
fentanyl about his belief that the bill was not considered because, “[a]s a Republican from a reliably 
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these bills failed to provide sustainable funding for needed services,187 politicians 
viewed introducing these unfunded opioid-related bills as being responsive to a 
pressing societal concern while being fiscally responsible.188 
The opioid debate demonstrates that Congress is willing to tackle tough 
questions regarding how to respond to addiction, but despite its name, CARA is not 
a comprehensive approach to substance use disorders. It and SUPPORT left open 
larger questions on an overall approach to drug policy. How Congress responded to 
the opioid epidemic versus its prior responses to drug abuse raises questions about 
racial equity, an issue of importance in the marijuana debate.189 The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that victims of opioid overdoses were 
overwhelmingly white, tended to be male, and middle-aged.190 Four of the five most 
affected states—West Virginia, New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Ohio191—are rural 
and tend to lean Republican or be politically competitive.192 Many Americans, 
particularly in rural communities, supported a government response as necessary to 
stem the tide of opioid misuse.193 Thus, in addition to the moral and public-health 
reasons for the response to the epidemic, the majority party in Congress had a 
political incentive to respond to this drug epidemic differently than prior federal 
responses.194 As the electorate shifts though, incoming policymakers will need to 
 
red district who wasn’t going to face a difficult path to reelection, he didn’t need a legislative success 
to tout on the campaign trail.”). 
187  Brianna Ehley, Congress’ Latest Opioid Bill Won’t Solve the Crisis, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 
2018, 7:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/17/congress-opioids-crisis-illegal-drugs-
792373 [http://perma.cc/3SQY-R9H2] (“Public health experts and first responders say the massive 
bipartisan legislation . . . takes some important steps toward better access to treatment but lacks the 
urgency, breadth and steady long-term funding required to quell the emergency . . . . ”). 
188  Ehley & Haberkorn, supra note 186 (“Republican supporters of the bills say the extended 
time on the floor reflects how seriously the House takes the opioid issue. Most of the bills sponsored 
by vulnerable lawmakers are not controversial, in part because they don't designate new spending.”). 
189  Supra note 96. 
190  Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United 
States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1448, 1450 tbls.1 & 2 (2016). 
191  See id. at 1447 fig.1. 
192  See Paul Chisholm, Analysis Finds Geographic Overlap in Opioid Use and Trump Support 
in 2016, NPR (June 23, 2018, 8:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/23/ 
622692550/analysis-finds-geographic-overlap-in-opioid-use-and-trump-support-in-2016 
[http://perma.cc/U86H-NGKS]. 
193  Danielle Kurtzleben, Poll: Rural Americans Rattled by Opioid Epidemic; Many Want 
Government Help, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/10/17/656515170/poll-
rural-americans-rattled-by-opioid-epidemic-many-want-government-help [http://perma.cc/XEV2-
SUEE]. 
194  162 CONG. REC. H2372 (daily ed. May 13, 2016) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (noting 
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confront why they addressed the harms that opioids posed on one constituency while 
failing to address how marijuana criminalization imposed harms on another.195 
 
C. The First Step Act: Political Willingness to Address Criminal Justice Reform 
 
As aforementioned, the CSA has moved steadily away from its public health 
roots and more toward a focus on criminal punishments, and changing this focus 
seems like a notable hurdle for marijuana legalization to overcome. Although the 
CSA originally eliminated nearly all of the existing mandatory minimum sentences 
for drug crimes,196 Congress reversed course in the 1980s.197 Mandatory minimum 
sentences are most severe for trafficking drugs listed on Schedules I and II, with 
marijuana falling into Schedule I.198 
In recent years, policymakers—even conservative ones—have taken on 
criminal-justice issues such as sentencing reform,199 and the electorate’s response 
has often been positive, rather than seeing such changes negatively as a “soft on 
crime” position.200 If the politics are shifting on criminal justice issues, these shifts 
 
that many of those who turned to crack cocaine were incarcerated rather than offered treatment); see 
supra notes 190–193. 
195  See Infra to Section IV-A. 
196  See supra notes 23–47. 
197  Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses, supra note 108, at 2–3. 
198  Id. at 9–10 (discussing the mandatory minimums for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a))). 
199  Timothy Williams & Thomas Kaplan, The Criminal Justice Debate Has Changed 
Drastically. Here’s Why., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/ 
politics/criminal-justice-reform-sanders-warren.html [http://perma.cc/N56G-Q7MD] (discussing how 
previously “radical” ideas were being debated as part of the Democratic presidential nomination 
campaign due to “a seismic shift in how the American public views criminal justice issues”). 
Additionally, several reforms have occurred at the state level, such as restoring voting rights in purple 
states, like Virginia and Florida. See id. (discussing a California initiative limiting the use of deadly 
force); see also Victoria Shineman, Florida Restores Voting Rights to 1.5 Million Citizens, Which 
Might Also Decrease Crime, CONVERSATION (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/ 
florida-restores-voting-rights-to-1-5-million-citizens-which-might-also-decrease-crime-106528. 
200  See Poll Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Prison, Sentencing Reforms, S. COMM. 
ON JUD. (Aug. 23, 2018), www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/poll-shows-americans-
overwhelmingly-support-prison-sentencing-reforms [http://perma.cc/DKC5-UG8C]; see also 91 
Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), 
http://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-
polling-finds [http://perma.cc/GT7R-87DR]. However, attitudes toward criminal justice and 
sentencing reforms have a partisan bent. See John Gramlich, Voters’ Perception of Crime Continue to 
Conflict With Reality, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality 
[http://perma.cc/AXG3-J4AB] (“Almost eight-in-ten voters who supported President-elect Donald 
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could signal a willingness to engage in meaningful change for the treatment of 
marijuana.201 Legalizing marijuana and regulating its sales could eliminate many 
low-level drug crimes.202 
Like marijuana legalization, sentencing reform had been enacted in several 
states before federal policymakers decided to debate the issue.203 In 2015, sentencing 
reform at the federal level took shape when a key Republican, Senate Judiciary 
Chairman Chuck Grassley, agreed to pursue bipartisan reforms.204 These efforts 
seemed doomed after the 2016 elections ushered in a more conservative government 
that seemed less supportive of sentencing reform205: for instance, President Trump 
campaigned on206—and continues to call for207—hardline “law and order” policies 
 
Trump (78%) said this, as did 37% of backers of Democrat Hillary Clinton” and believed that crime 
worsened between 2008 and 2016, although “U.S. violent crime and property crime rates fell 19% and 
23%, respectively,” from 2008 to 2015); see also Little Partisan Agreement on the Pressing Problems 
Facing the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/10/15/little-
partisan-agreement-on-the-pressing-problems-facing-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/LX2A-GW9A] (noting 
that while Democrats and Republicans shared similar views on whether “violent crime (49% of 
Republicans, 47% of Democrats) and drug addiction (67% of Republicans, 64% of Democrats)” were 
priority issues before the 2018 elections, “71% of Democratic voters say the way racial and ethnic 
minorities are treated by the criminal justice system is a very big problem for the country, compared 
with just 10% of Republican voters.”). 
201  See Ames Grawert and Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law- and What Happens 
Next, BRENNAN CENTER (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next (noting that a potential next step to 
federal sentencing reforms passed in 2018 would be “eliminat[ing] incarceration for lower-level 
crimes, such as minor marijuana trafficking”). 
202  O’Brien, supra note 86, at 438–40; see also Meagan Nettles, The Sobering Failure of 
America’s “War on Drugs”: Free the P.O.W.s, 55 Cal. W.L. Rev. 275, 294 n.125 (2018) (discussing 
a harsh sentence for marijuana); Hutchins, supra note 93 (discussing the New Jersey debate over state 
expungement of marijuana-related crimes). 
203  Nettles, supra note 202, at 308–310; Miriam S. Gohara, Keep on Keeping On: Maintaining 
Momentum for Criminal Justice Reform During the Trump Era, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 6–8 (2018). 
204  See Antonio Ginatta, Dispatches: Strange Bedfellows for US Criminal Justice Reform, HUM. 
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/01/dispatches-strange-
bedfellows-us-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/YM94-AR8L]. 
205  Hopwood, supra note 47, at 797. 
206  Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a Crime Bill Both Parties Backed, NY TIMES 
(Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/senate-dysfunction-blocks-bipartis 
an-criminal-justice-overhaul.html (noting that Trump’s 2016 campaign included “warnings of a United 
States at risk from sinister forces, even though violent crime is low compared with past decades”). 
207  Christina Wilkie, Trump Praises ‘Stop and Frisk,’ Calls For Tougher Policing Tactics, 
CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 4:06 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/trump-praises-stop-and-frisk-calls-
for-tougher-policing-tactics.html [http://perma.cc/7J96-DYTW]. In relation to the opioid epidemic, 
Trump seemingly called for the death penalty for drug trafficking. Ayesha Rascoe, How Trump Went 
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and selected a conservative nominee for Attorney General who was well known for 
his opposition to marijuana legalization and similar policy changes.208 
An unusual coalition of disparate interests, however, was able to sustain the 
momentum for criminal justice reforms.209 These key discrete constituencies in the 
unusual political coalition provided the political cover necessary to overcome the 
“law and order” resistance210 against the modest reforms in the bipartisan First Step 
Act.211 Trump’s eventual embrace of First Step helped overcome some Senate 
Republicans’ reservations of supporting it.212 Even so, First Step passed only in the 
 
From ‘Tough on Crime’ To ‘Second Chance’ For Felons, NPR MORNING EDITION (Dec. 17, 2018, 5:00 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/676771335/how-trump-went-from-tough-on-crime-to-second-
chance-for-felons [http://perma.cc/T82Z-HRK5] (quoting President Trump as suggesting “at some 
point, we'll get very smart as a nation and give them the ultimate punishment”). 
208  Jordan Waldrep, What Replacing Jeff Sessions As AG Means For Marijuana Legalization, 
FORBES (Nov. 13, 2018, 8:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanwaldrep/2018/11/13/what-
replacing-jeff-sessions-as-ag-means-for-marijuana-legalization/#1a138ae0103f 
[http://perma.cc/2DAG-7J2K]. Most notably, during his tenure, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
reversed the so-called Cole memo, which was guidance issued under the Obama Administration that 
permitted U.S. Attorneys to focus resources away from marijuana prosecutions in states where its use 
was permitted. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana 
Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-
marijuana-enforcement (noting rescission of prior guidance on prosecuting marijuana felonies). 
209  Ray Suarez, Trump’s Push For Prison Reform, On Point, WBUR (May 21, 2018), 
http://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/05/21/trump-prison-reform [http://perma.cc/HW4H-3PSQ]. 
210  Osita Nwanevu, The Improbable Success of a Criminal-Justice-Reform Bill Under Trump, 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 17, 2018), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-improbable-success-
of-a-criminal-justice-reform-bill-under-trump (“The significant buy-in from the right is the 
culmination of years of effort from a cadre of libertarian-leaning conservatives, like the anti-tax zealot 
Grover Norquist, and evangelicals, such as Chuck Colson, the founder of the Christian nonprofit 
organization Prison Fellowship, who have worked to convince others that the prison system has become 
too costly, punitive, and government-empowering.”). Arthur Rizer & Lars Trautman, The Conservative 
Case for Criminal Justice Reform, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/05/the-conservative-case-for-criminal-justice-reform 
(arguing why “conservatives must go back to the principles of liberty and dignity that first defined their 
party,” and apply “these principles to criminal justice reform”). Key influential conservatives were 
moved by the massive costs for maintaining a vast prison system with seemingly little effect on crime 
rates, Spillane & Wolcott, supra note 21, at 279 (noting “the high social costs of mass incarceration”), 
as well as an increasing policy presence—particularly by the federal government—that threatened 
individual liberties. See Criminal Justice Reform, CHARLES KOCH INST., http://www.charleskoch 
institute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-policing-reform/. But see Bill Keller, How Criminal Justice 
Reform Died, VICE (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvewn7/how-criminal-justice-
reform-died-bill-keller (arguing that the “spectacular mustering of bipartisan solidarity at a time of 
political polarization and paralysis . . . was not nearly as muscular as it seemed”). 
211  For an overview of the First Step Act, see The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview, 
Congressional Research Service (March 4, 2019). 
212  Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, whose father had served time in federal prison, is often 
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“lame duck” session following the 2018 midterm elections,213 in part because the 
legislative debate over the bill was very divisive among the Republican majority and 
exposed different schisms within conservative philosophy.214 
First Step represents a series of compromises, again paralleling some of the 
compromises between the Nixon Administration and the Democratic Congress over 
the CSA.215 Marijuana reformers can point to First Step to demonstrate that, just as 
Congress was able to pass the CSA’s sentencing reforms,216 there is a majority in 
Congress willing to take a critical look at our criminalization policies.217 But 
marijuana reform advocates should also heed warnings from First Step’s difficult 
passage: despite Trump’s endorsement and a coalition including conservative 
interests, many conservative legislators opposed sentencing reform.218 More 
critically, First Step would not have passed had it made its sentencing reforms 
retroactive.219 For those who believe that marijuana reform must include equitable 
remedies for those individuals and communities who have borne the brunt of the 
CSA’s treatment of marijuana, this issue could be a difficult barrier. 
 
IV. BEYOND AMENDING THE CSA: STATE DEBATES REVEAL OTHER KEY ISSUES 
 
As discussed in the prior section, there are recent legislative accomplishments 
 
credited for pushing Trump to support First Step. Rascoe, supra note 207. Trump’s embrace of First 
Step has led subsequently to strange confrontations over credit for its passage. See Jacey Fortin, Trump 
Insults Chrissy Teigen and John Legend, and They Fire Back, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/us/chrissy-teigen-trump-twitter.html. 
213  Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Criminal Justice Reform Bill Still Alive As McConnell 
Deliberates, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:12 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/29/congress-
criminal-justice-reform-senate-mcconnell-1032469. 
214  Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Cotton Wields Sex Offender report to Tank Prisons Bill, 
POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/26/tom-cotton-criminal-
justice-reform-senate-republicans-trump-1015149. Given the limited window for debate on the Senate 
floor, Senate leaders are generally reluctant to bring up bills that divide their caucus and could delay 
other competing legislative priorities. Andrew Kragie, Mitch McConnell Appears to Be Killing 
Bipartisan Sentencing Reform, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2018/12/mcconnell-will-not-move-bipartisan-sentencing-bill/577684/ (predicting that FIRST 
STEP would garner “25 to 30 Republican votes” in the Senate—or about half the GOP caucus at the 
time—meaning that the legislation “extremely divisive” according to Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell). 
215  See supra Part I-A. 
216  Courtwright, supra note 3, at 12. 
217  Hopwood, supra note 47, at 795 (describing First Step’s passage as “almost miraculous[]”). 
218  See supra notes 211–214. 
219  Hopwood, supra note 47, at 811. 
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that suggest that Congress may be ready to revisit the CSA and its fifty-year 
treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I drug. While some advocates may hope that a 
future administration could reschedule marijuana, it is not an easy solution, nor 
would such a regulatory move address all the complex issues surrounding a change 
in marijuana’s status under federal law. The following section builds on a legislative 
approach by identifying several—but not exhaustive—items that could be included 
in a reform effort. As brought to light in part by state efforts, there are underlying 
questions of equity, state differences, and ways to prevent future policy conflicts that 
lawmakers ought to consider. Supposing that some federal reform—even 
incremental reform—could amend the CSA, it is worth asking what sorts of reform 
that proponents—advocates, providers, and states with regulatory programs—
should ask for beyond rescheduling marijuana. 
 
A.  Creating Equity by Recognizing Communities Hurt by the CSA 
 
The prior two sections raised some fundamental questions about the legacy of 
the CSA and our country’s approach to the opioid epidemic and entrenched 
resistance to reforming marijuana policy. The same issues continue to repeat 
themselves: there is a segment of society that is uncomfortable with the 
criminalization of drug use and addiction, just as there is a segment of society that 
associates drug use with criminal elements and deviant behavior.220 Moreover, there 
is a long history of attributing those criminal elements to the poor, minorities, and 
the youth, and this history parallels the move to amend the CSA towards a law 
enforcement approach rather than a public health approach.221 
In this light, CARA and SUPPORT seem like an aberration, not a change in 
course, because the policy response is due to the public face of those who were 
initially affected by the opioid epidemic: an older, whiter, and male demographic.222 
Additionally, many of these individuals became addicted not by choice but because 
of failures in our healthcare system. Adding to this sympathy, some conservative 
commentators wrote: 
 
America’s nationwide opioid epidemic has not been accompanied by a 
nationwide crime wave (excepting of course the apparent explosion of 
illicit heroin use). Just the opposite: As best can be told, national 
 
220  Spillane, supra note 14, at 23 (“[T]wo general and competing models emerge¾the 
‘deviance’ and ‘victimization’ models of drug abuse.”). 
221  Neill, supra note 47, at 377 (“To the extent that drug offenders are perceived negatively, 
undeserving of assistance, and deserving of punishment, drug policies are likely to reflect and 
perpetuate these sentiments. Insofar as the population identified with drug use overlaps with other 
populations—racial minorities and the poor—who are already viewed as threatening to social order, 
then punitive policies can appear justified.”). 
222  Rudd, supra note 190, at 1450 tbl.2. 
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victimization rates for violent crimes and property crimes have both 
reportedly dropped by about two-thirds over the past two decades.223 
 
Issues of equity will need to be addressed in order to see meaningful reform. 
The failure to deal with the consequences of fifty years of prosecutions aimed at 
minority communities caused high profile failures to pass legislation in New York 
and New Jersey.224 Equity means more than reversing prior convictions but also 
investing revenue raised from marijuana sales into the communities most damaged 
by the legacy of the CSA.225 
 
B. Building Evidence for Policy Changes 
 
Another issue is that policy decisions around marijuana are often being made 
without strong scientific evidence because of how the CSA classifies marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug. States are looking at other states’ experiences with marijuana 
legalization to learn about best practices and unforeseen issues.226 But while the 
economics of legalization are becoming better understood, the CSA restricts medical 
research, limiting the ability of consumers, patients, and providers to have adequate 
knowledge of newly available products. The National Academy of Medicine (NAM) 
noted in a literature review that 
 
the growing acceptance, accessibility, and use of cannabis and its 
derivatives have raised important public health concerns. Moreover, the 
lack of any aggregated knowledge of cannabis-related health effects has 
led to uncertainty about what, if any, are the harms or benefits from its 
use . . . As laws and policies continue to change, research must also.227 
 
223  Nicholas Eberstadt, Our Miserable 21st Century, COMMENTARY (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/our-miserable-21st-century. [http://perma.cc/DJ25-
XQSH]. But see German Lopez, Why the Opioid Epidemic May Have Fueled America’s Murder Spike, 
VOX (Feb. 6, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/6/16934054/opioid-
epidemic-murder-violent-crime [http://perma.cc/PR6G-4JMB] (noting that as the opioid epidemic 
shifts from prescription drug misuse to use of illicit drugs, such as heroin, it may be related to an 
increase in the murder rate because of violence associated with illegal drug trafficking). 
224  Supra notes 93 and 95. 
225  Supra notes 125–127 and 194. 
226  J.B. Wogan, For This Pot Guy, States Are His Biggest Customers, GOVERNING (Aug. 2017), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-marijuana-colorado-andrew-freedman-states-
regulation.html [http://perma.cc/H5WT-C29T] (“[A]fter voters approve a marijuana measure, officials 
look for advice from the few places with some experience in taxing and regulating legal marijuana” 
with Colorado “field[ing] calls from more than 25 states asking for guidance.”). 
227  Nearly 100 Conclusions on the Health Effects of Marijuana and Cannabis-Derived Products 
Presented in New Report, NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/ 
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Efforts to expand medical research are slowly moving forward in response to 
the NAM concern. In 2016, the DEA called for applications from marijuana growers 
to become licensed medical researchers.228 Approval of these applications stalled 
under then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions,229 but Attorney General William Barr 
since has announced that the DEA has resumed reviewing the applications.230 Some 
hope that other parts of the federal government are taking actions that suggest they 
might be more receptive to marijuana research.231 Additionally, bipartisan 
legislation has been released that would reform the research process while 
maintaining marijuana’s current place on the CSA schedule.232 
Such research could be useful in validating prior studies, helping consumers,233 
and making informed policy decisions—especially policymakers looking to amend 
marijuana policy as a means of addressing the opioid epidemic. For instance, in 




228  Applications To Become Registered Under the Controlled Substances Act To Manufacture 
Marijuana To Supply Researchers in the United States, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 53846 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
229  See Jeffrey Miron, Jeff Sessions Stonewalls Permission for Medical Marijuana Research, 
CATO INST. (July 12, 2018, 11:30 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/jeff-sessions-stonewalls-permission-
medical-marijuana-research [http://perma.cc/3WSK-33UL]. 
230  Sara B. Somerset, The DEA Is Rewriting Obama’s Federal Cannabis Regulations, FORBES 
(Aug. 28, 2019, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarabrittanysomerset/2019/08/28/the-dea-has-
rewritten-obamas-federal-cannabis-regulations/#6d7701553dae [http://perma.cc/9TG3-MAVM] 
(noting the difficulties in qualifying because manufacturers that already process marijuana in state-
licensed arrangements cannot become federally qualified producers). 
231  Compare Hoffmann, supra note 58 (“[T]he first time that the FDA has found the marijuana 
plant, in this case an extract, has an accepted medical use.”), with Jerome Adams, Marijuana Use & 
the Developing Brain, HHS (Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/reports-and-
publications/addiction-and-substance-misuse/advisory-on-marijuana-use-and-developing-
brain/index.html [http://perma.cc/74LM-CNWN] (“Science-based messaging campaigns and targeted 
prevention programming are urgently needed to ensure that risks are clearly communicated and 
amplified by local, state, and national organizations.”). 
232  Feinstein, Grassley, Schatz Introduce Bill to Expand Cannabidiol, Marijuana Research, 
OFFICE OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (June 27, 2019), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/2019/6/feinstein-grassley-schatz-introduce-bill-to-expand-cannabidiol-marijuana-
research [https://perma.cc/8C7K-LSC4]. 
233  See, e.g., Bridget Small, Serious Health Claims for CBD Products Need Proof, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 10, 2019), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/09/serious-
health-claims-cbd-products-need-proof?utm_source=govdelivery [http://perma.cc/5BT9-3CCB] 
(issuing a warning against three companies for making health claims about products containing 
cannabidiol (CBD), a chemical compound derived from the cannabis plant). 
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[s]tates with medical cannabis laws had a 24.8% lower mean annual opioid 
overdose mortality rate . . . compared with states without medical cannabis 
laws. Examination of the association between medical cannabis laws and 
opioid analgesic overdose mortality in each year after implementation of 
the law showed that such laws were associated with a lower rate of 
overdose mortality that generally strengthened over time . . . .234 
 
The study became widely used in justifying legalization not only domestically 
but even internationally.235 Others, though, argue that “marijuana is a companion 
drug rather than substitution drug and that marijuana use may be contributing to the 
opioid epidemic rather than improving it”—something that could be worrisome if 
ultimately correct.236 Thus, reflecting the 2017 NAM position, some researchers 
worried that: 
 
For many reasons, ranging from significant barriers to research on 
cannabis and cannabinoids to impatience, cannabis policy has raced ahead 
of cannabis science in the United States. For science to guide policy, 
funding the aforementioned studies must be a priority at the federal and 
state level. Many companies and states (via taxes) are profiting from the 
cannabis industry while failing to support research at the level necessary 
to advance the science. This situation has to change to get definitive 
answers on the possible role for cannabis in the opioid crisis, as well as the 
other potential harms and benefits of legalizing cannabis.237 
 
C. Anticipating Future State-Federal Conflicts 
 
While it may be hard to imagine the regulatory and criminal fields as 
complicated between states and federal laws as they are today over marijuana as they 
might be over another substance in the future, perhaps we should think more broadly 
about federalism under the CSA. What if states had a larger say in the CSA 
 
234  Marcus A. Bachhuber et al., Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose 
Mortality in the United States, 1999–2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668 (2014). 
235  Brittany Flaherty, Legalizing Medical Cannabis Reduces Opioid Overdose Deaths? Not so 
Fast, New Study Says, STAT (June 10, 2019), http://www.statnews.com/2019/06/10/legalizing-medical-
marijuana-opioid-overdose-deaths/ [http://perma.cc/552B-YDZ3] (quoting a researcher in Australia 
that the 2014 study has “been cited in my own country as compelling evidence that medical cannabis 
reduces opioid overdose deaths”). 
236  Kenneth Finn, Why Marijuana Will Not Fix the Opioid Epidemic, 115 MO. MED. 191, 193 
(2018), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6140166/pdf/ms115_p0191.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/CF29-GYFL]. 
237  Kevin P. Hill & Andrew J. Saxon, The Role of Cannabis Legalization in the Opioid Crisis, 
178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 679, 680 (2018). 
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scheduling beyond just being another party that can petition the DEA to reschedule 
a drug? 
Further, simply legalizing marijuana may not be in all states’ interests as they 
consider their domestic needs. First, most states have legalized marijuana for 
medicinal, not recreational, purposes. Having a federal policy was intended to 
provide uniformity to how the country treated interdiction broadly,238 but now there 
is a patchwork approach given the wide variation between states on whether to 
legalize marijuana use and for what purposes.239 Second, states intending to reap 
economic benefits from new growers and local consumption may be disappointed if 
their domestic markets are overrun by out-of-state competitors, particularly from 
states over-producing marijuana well beyond the needs of their own residents.240 
Commentators have suggested creating such an opt-out mechanism or 
waiver from the CSA to allow for “cooperative federalism” for marijuana.241 Such 
waivers would allow states to remain fully under the terms of the CSA whereas 
others could opt out of having the CSA criminalize activity within their borders.242 
“Thus, businesses and individuals complying with state marijuana laws would be 
free not just from the threat of federal prosecution, but from the ancillary 
consequences of federal prohibition as well.”243 States’ ability to opt out of the CSA 
could be conditioned on adopting an advanced regulatory regime on controlled 
substances similar to the minimum requirements suggested by the Justice 
Department’s memorandum under the Obama Administration.244 
A similar model would be to allow states to enter into interstate compacts, 
which are binding agreements between states to treat an activity according to a 
uniform standard and abide by certain minimum criteria.245 States also have used 
compacts to lessen the federal government’s interest in establishing a national 
 
238  Supra notes 16–34. 
239  Supra Section II, Parts A-B. 
240  Fertig, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that Oregon has passed a law that would trigger legal 
interstate trade if the CSA is amended while Colorado is seeking to erect more barriers to interstate 
trade to protect its domestic growers). 
241  Kamin, supra note 6, at 644–646; Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 120–22. 
242  Kamin, supra note 6, at 645. 
243  Id. 
244  Supra note 208 (discussing Attorney General Sessions’s reversal of the prior administration’s 
policy on prosecuting marijuana cases). 
245  ANDREW WINSTON, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
at 2–3 (2018). 
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baseline or preempting a field.246 For instance, state licensing boards for health 
professionals introduced compacts that would allow health professionals to apply 
for reciprocity to practice in all states agreeing to the compact.247 These compacts 
become effective only when a minimum number of states agree to adopt them by 
enacting enabling legislation.248 In part, licensing boards adopted these policies to 
avoid federal legislation that would have preempted state licensing law in order to 
spur adoption of telehealth across state lines.249 
Similarly, if states moved in a similar direction on other drug policies in the 
future as they have done in regards to marijuana, one could see how they would want 
to not only waive out of federal criminalization of an activity within their borders 
but also to ensure such activities do not foreclose their citizens from federal benefits. 
But rather than return to the patchwork of regulation prior to the CSA, the federal 
government could authorize waivers only if certain criteria were met. Alternatively, 
the federal government could condition waiving the CSA only if a certain number 
of states agreed, like a compact. States could also use such agreements to limit the 





Looking forward to predict the next stage of the CSA, it’s important to 
remember that in this statute’s fifty-year-old treatment of marijuana, the first 
divergent state policy—California’s Proposition 215—did not occur until the 
midpoint of the CSA’s history.251 Much could change in this anniversary year if the 
election produces a very different administration and Congress. 252 Yet even with 
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political changes, it is possible that efforts to amend the CSA could be overshadowed 
by other events.253 
Could reform efforts take another 25 or more years before being successful at 
the federal level? The aforementioned recent efforts around drug policy—including 
thinking about addiction, criminal justice, and drug access—suggest that there is an 
emerging foundation for advocates to build from to amend the CSA successfully. 
But advocates should recognize from these efforts that even if change seems 
inevitable due to the speed of states’ policy changes, the immediate federal-policy 
horizon may look quite different and be resistant to change. 
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